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Workers’ Compensation:
Analysis for Its Second Century

Count us among those who believe
that today’s workers’ compensation
programs have the potential to serve
for another 100 years, but they will
require significant improvement. We
call upon legislative bodies to address
current shortcomings, and we call
upon the research community to
provide appropriate guidance for these
efforts.
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Regulating Access to Work
in the Gig Labor Market
The Case of Uber
Morris M. Kleiner
U.S. labor markets traditionally
have included long-term employment
relationships that last many years
or decades. They also have been
characterized by internal labor
markets, unions, and a web of rules
that, often by law, both employers and
workers are required to observe. New
innovations and technologies, such as
smart phones and their accompanying
apps, have allowed labor markets to
become more fluid and responsive
to spot market supply and demand
conditions. They have allowed workers
more flexibility in their choice of hours
worked, and have allowed consumers
to better evaluate the quality of
services. As a result, gig labor markets,
which let workers easily book jobs by
the hour or project, have grown and
flourished. The number of workers
directly working through apps now
comprise nearly 1 percent of the total
workforce, making gig labor markets
one of the fastest growing areas in the
labor force (Katz and Krueger 2016;
Torpey and Hogan 2016).
Workers who have entered the
gig labor market have few of the
government regulations or web of
rules that govern traditional labor
markets. In addition, labor laws such as
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
National Labor Relations Act usually
do not apply to these workers (Harris

and Krueger 2015). Yet one area of
labor market regulation, occupational
licensing, is pervasive, and in this
article, I examine the interaction of this
institution in one large company that
operates largely in the gig economy.
The Uber Innovation
The ride-sharing firm Uber
has come to exemplify the recent
technology “revolution” and labor
market outcomes embodied in the
gig economy. It had 84–87 percent
of the total ride-sharing trips (i.e.,
cab-substitute markets) in 2016 and
is currently active in 450 cities in
the United States and worldwide.1
Uber began offering its first rides in
2010 in San Francisco and in New
York City in 2011 as a way to match
individuals who needed rides to work
or recreation with those individuals
who were willing to provide those rides
for a price. The creation of an app and
accompanying software allowed this
matching process to be done in an
efficient and profitable manner for the
company (Roth and Ockenfels 2002).
Uber takes a percentage of the ride
price for the company as their fee for
matching the drivers and riders. The
drivers anticipate an ample supply of
customers, and the waiting times for
drivers in traditional cabs were reduced
and revenues enhanced for those
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n The number of workers directly working through apps now comprise nearly 1 percent of the total workforce, making gig labor markets one of the fastest growing areas
in the labor force.

Marcus Dillender is senior economist and H. Allan
Hunt is senior economist emeritus, both at the Upjohn
Institute.

n Evidence from a quasi-experiment in New York and New Jersey suggests that
there are few gains from occupational licensing of ride-sharing providers as assessed
through customer satisfaction or measures of customer safety.

EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH • JULY 2017

Regulations for Driving
One of the major labor market
issues affecting Uber drivers is
occupational licensing (Porter
2015). About one-quarter of the U.S.
workforce must acquire a license from
the government in order to work
for pay (Bureau of Labor Statistics
2016). In some cities—New York, for
example—ride-sharing without a taxi
license is illegal. The requirements
for licensure in New York City are
stringent, and the licensure process
takes three months on average, with
upfront costs of at least $2,000. In
addition, the driver must complete
a defensive driving course, pass a
medical exam, be subjected to a
drug test, undergo fingerprint and
background checks, take classes on
wheelchair-accessible vehicle training,
acquire a commercial vehicle license,
and purchase commercial vehicle
insurance. These substantial fixed costs
result in fewer drivers but much lower

turnover rates for Uber drivers in New
York than in any other U.S. city where
the company operates; they also result
in longer working hours (Hall et al.
2017). Figure 1 shows driver turnover
by city. New York City has lower
turnover, and Houston, which has few
regulations for drivers, has relatively
high turnover of drivers.
Figure 2 shows that the ratio of New
York Uber drivers to the population of
the city or the metropolitan statistical
area is considerably lower than either
Chicago or San Francisco, and the base
prices are higher (Hall et al. 2017).
Although traditional medallion taxi
drivers can serve as substitutes for
Uber drivers in any city, the number
of Uber drivers in New York is
considerably lower than in Chicago
or San Francisco. Also, the base Uber
fares in Chicago and San Francisco are
lower than those in New York City for
both 2015 and 2016.
Evaluating Quality
One of the least studied areas of
occupational licensing is its influence

on the quality of services (Kleiner
and Kudrle 2000). However, a recent
analysis in the New York City/New
Jersey area notes that drivers who
sign up to drive on the Uber app can
perform pickups in New Jersey, which
is directly on the opposite side of the
Hudson River from New York City,
but drivers who sign-up in New Jersey,
which does not require an occupational
license, cannot perform pickups in the
city (Hall et al. 2017). Thus, the study
compares quality and safety outcomes
for rides performed in New Jersey by
New York City and New Jersey drivers.
There is quasi-random assignment
of rides because Uber’s dispatch
algorithm, which determines the driver
for a particular ride request, is based
on factors other than licensing. While
the algorithm has evolved over time, it
is mainly based on a driver’s proximity
to a rider’s location (also based on time
to the customer). Consequently, a ride
is essentially randomly assigned to a
licensed driver from New York City or
an unlicensed driver from New Jersey
for pick-up requests that occur in many

Figure 1 Percent of Uber Driver-Partners Remaining Active, by City
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providing rides. Drivers can choose
when and how many hours they want
to work. In 2017 the company had
more than 734,000 active drivers in the
United States and more than 1,500,000
drivers worldwide.2 The economic
value of the company is estimated to be
almost $70 billion, and despite recent
negative publicity, it is still one of the
major economic success stories and
labor market innovators (Bensinger
2017).
One unique aspect of the Uber
performance evaluation system is that
the customer evaluates the driver and
vice-versa on a scale of one to five, with
five being the highest. The majority—
nearly 86 percent—of drivers earn
a rating of 5. Drivers and customers
whose ratings fall below a specified
value determined by the company lose
their ability to access the app and are
effectively fired from using the ridesharing system. Consequently, there
are incentives for both customers and
drivers to do well in their respective
roles.
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parts of New Jersey. The results of the
data analysis using the quasi-random
assignment of rides methodology
show very little statistically significant
differences in measured quality by
riders through measures of rider
satisfaction. Also, there was little or no
difference in the safety of rides based
on the number of driver hard stops,
rapid accelerations, or complaints to
the company of poor ride performance,
based on whether the driver was from
a jurisdiction that required a license in
order to work.
Implications for Policy
Two of the most rapidly growing
segments of the labor market are
the growth of the gig economy and
occupational regulations in the
labor market through licensing by
government. Uber is faced with both
issues because of its business model.
As current findings suggest, cities that
impose rigorous licensing standards,
such as New York, have fewer Uber
drivers per capita and higher base fares
than either Chicago or San Francisco.

The evidence from a quasi-experiment
in New York and New Jersey suggests
that there are few gains from
occupational licensing of ride-sharing
providers as assessed through customer
satisfaction or measures of customer
safety. Before state or local government
enact additional regulations, access to
the labor market and its influence on
customer prices, satisfaction, and safety
need to be considered as key elements
of governmental labor market licensing
policies.
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